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Bribery and the Multinationals in Latin America:
Only the Tip of the Iceberg
MARY E. FABRE*
1. INTRODUCTION
The current fervor over bribery and other questionable payments made
by or on behalf of large multinational corporations (MNCs) is due to
several factors. First is the awareness that since the end of World War 1,
multinational enterprises have needed international guidelines for their con-
duct.' However, mere awareness of a need for control was not enough to stir
action; the real precipitating factors were the scandal and the discoveries of
Watergate.2 Impropriety, beginning in the Office of the President of the
United States and filtering throughout the political, economic and business
sectors of our society, shocked the consciences of Americans and the rest of
the world. A sense of moral indignation over the abuse of power, and the
use of money to achieve that end, encouraged demands for investigation and
disclosure of information concerning the practices of corporations involved
in making questionable payments at home and abroad.
In the midst of Watergate, Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox's in-
vestigations of the Nixon Finance Committee revealed that twenty major
corporations admitted their misuse of corporate funds.' Top business ex-
ecutives who had been solicited by the Nixon Committee became entangled
in the web of illegality when the investigation uncovered the use of cor-
porate funds for campaign contributions. Some of America's largest public
companies were convicted of violations of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act.4
Because the integrity of top management was at issue, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) entered the scene, requiring disclosure to
shareholders of the use of corporate funds, and obtaining commitments
from the corporations to investigate other illegal contributions.5 Since pay-
ments had been made to foreign agents, the SEC required a check on their
accounts to see if the money had returned to the United States. Almost in-
cidentally, Stanley Sporken, head of the SEC Enforcement Division, also
required that agents' accounts be checked for other improper payments.
Outside directors' and auditors' investigations began the process, while
voluntary disclosures followed. As of May 1976, SEC investigations
* J.D. University of Miami School of Law.
1. M. Joelson & J. Griffin, International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices
Engaged in by Transnational Enterprises: A Prognosis, II Int'l Law. 5 (1977).
2. L. Cutler, Watergate International Style. 24 For. Pol'y 160 (1976).
3. Id. at 161
4. Statement of Roderick M. Hills, Chairman SEC, Before the Subcommittee on Priorities
and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee. The SEC Speaks in 1976
(Sommer & Levenson Co-Chr. 1976).
5. Cutler, supra note 2, at 162.
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revealed corrupt foreign payments by over three hundred American com-
panies involving hundreds of millions of dollars.
6
These investigations and subsequent disclosures of improper conduct
and questionable payments raised serious political concerns at home and
abroad as to how far multinational firms would go to subvert national
governments and their policies in order to achieve their business purposes.'
Furthermore, it is readily apparent, merely from the SEC's discoveries,
that the United States has great difficulty controlling its own corporate en-
tities. National corporate laws originally designed to control domestic
business enterprises are inadequate even for their original purposes. On the
scale of multinational business organizations, there are virtually no legal
structures designed to accommodate, control or direct the vast economic
and political units that the MNCs have become.8
II. HOW QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS ARE MADE
A useful preliminary to an analysis of the impact of questionable pay-
ments by the MNCs on the host countries in Latin America, and on United
States policies, as well as a consideration of solutions to the payments
problem, is an explanation of the corporate practices employed.
One of the most convenient ways to generate corporate cash is
with the help of a foreign sales agent or consultant, who banks in a
place like Switzerland where the tax and exchange restrictions are
loose. Sometimes the agent is used as a foreign subsidiary of the
firm itself. The agent submits an outsize invoice which is paid by
check so that the records are clean, and on a later visit to the
United States, returns an agreed part of the proceeds in cash. The
cash then goes into a "black" or off-the-books account concealed
from the auditors, and can be used for any business purpose
without being recorded.'
Depending upon the purpose for the payment and the circumstances of the
transaction, certain patterns of conduct have emerged. Corporate funds
were paid to consultants abroad who used the money for payments to
foreign government officials or for political contributions. Corporate funds
were transferred to foreign bank accounts or to subsidiaries where foreign
employees withdrew funds to pay bribes, kickbacks and foreign political
contributions. In a few instances, funds were directly approved by corporate
management for foreign bribes and political contributions."
6. S. Rep. No. 114,95th Cong., 2nd Sess. reprinted in [t9781 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6306.
7. Cutler, supra note 2 at 164.
8 R. Tindall, Miltinational Enterprises (1975).
9. Cutler supra note 2, at 161.
10. Petition of the Project on Corporate Responsibility, The National Council of
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and Others... Before the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, The SEC Speaks in 1976 (Sommer and Levenson Co-Chr. 1976).
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In examining the various corporate practices, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between bribery and "grease" payments. The legal essence of
bribery is:
[A] payment voluntarily offered for the purpose of inducing a
public official to do or omit to do something in violation of his
lawful duty or to exercise his official discretion in favor of the
payor's request for a contract, concession or privilege or some
basis other than the merits."
A "grease" payment, on the other hand, is a payment to a minor official in-
tended to expedite a legal action, i.e. licensing, or helping legal imports
through customs. Although not condoned, such payments are generally
considered an institutionalized practice. They may be viewed as a necessary
entitlement or as additional compensation when a public salary is inade-
quate. I2
This distinction between the two types of payments made by MNCs is
necessary for several reasons. First, until the intentions for making the pay-
ments are known, it is difficult to ascertain whether there is indeed a
problem worthy of the time and energies of lawmakers. Second, the type of
payment will indicate the nature of the remedy to be implemented in order
to stop such payments from being made. Third, issues of morality, ethics
and comparative commercial practices may be raised regarding "grease"
payments, but are inappropriate considerations when dealing with bribery.'3
Bribery must be viewed in terms of the relationship of MNCs as large
business enterprises transcending the limits of market and societal restric-
tions by virtue of their accumulated economic and political powers, to
traditional international law notions of nation-states. MNCs employ the in-
strument of bribery to formulate corporate foreign policy by transnationally
linking interest groups in pursuit of common objectives.14 It is therefore
necessary to focus upon the emergence of the MNCs as a large number of
significant, nongovernmental, transnational, political actors with effects on
domestic politics, economics, and international relations. 5
III. MNCs' AS NEW WORLD POWERS
In seeking solutions to the problems of payments made by the MNCs,
examination of the structure of the corporations and the setting in which
they operate is imperative. MNCs are nonpolitical actors in the milieu of in-
ternational politics, where nation-states have traditionally been the only
significant players. However, MNCs function as transnational political ac-
tors because they command vast resources. Their autonomous operation
and organization allows them virtually to ignore national borders in pursuit
11. T. Sorenson, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals. 54 For. Aff. 719
at 722 (1976).
12. S. Kobrin, Morality, Political Power and Illegal Payments, Colum. J. World Bus. Win-
ter 1976 at 105.
13 Id.
14. Id. at 107.
15. Id. at 105.
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of their own best interests. Since the MNCs' operations are global, their
goal of profit-maximization through a central strategy transcending
national borders dictates their own foreign policy. 16 By mobilizing resources
sufficiently large to influence national policies to the MNCs' benefit, the
ideals of a host country are threatened by the imbalance of power so
created. Furthermore, the functioning of domestic politics in both the home
and host countries may be disrupted by violation of home foreign relations
policies and by interference with the objectives and societal values of the
host countries. A solution to the payments problem must be approached by
examining the character of the MNCs and developing a means of controll-
ing their conduct.
The world of MNCs is characterized by oligopolistic industry structure,
since foreign direct investment requires some degree of monopoly power.
"MNCs are responsible for mobilizing factors of production across national
frontiers, allocating resources among their operations in different nation-
states in accordance with a centralized management control system."' 7
However, among the MNCs, conduct, structure, strategy, and operation
lacks uniformity in much the same way as differences exist among countries.
In addition, diverse economic, social, and political conditions prevailing
among the host nations in which the MNCs operate, together with dis-
similarities between the home and host country's cultures, comprise a dif-
ficult setting for singular solutions.
The transnational political relationship between MNCs and national
governments must be viewed in light of the interactions between the host
society and its institutions, and between the parent corporation and its sub-
sidiary. For the MNC, a subsidiary in any country is generally important
only in relation to the corporation as a whole, thus engendering a situation
in which the interests of the MNC and the-host country may not coincide.
Host countries will find that MNCs are responsive to the demands of head-
quarters in another country and indirectly responsive to the demands of
another government. Thus, the MNCs' interests are less likely to be in line
with the national interests of the host country (not unlike the classic
historical conflict between foreign economic interests and nation-states).
The effect of this disharmony upon the host country in part depends upon
the scope and intensity of interaction between the host society and its in-
stitutions. Greater sensitivity to external policy formulations of the MNCs
is directly related to the degree of economic and social responsibility under-
taken by the host government and its working institutions.' 9
MNCs, as significant nongovernmental political actors with concen-
trated economic and political powers, operate with corporate business
power somewhat freed from market control. Within a host country, they
represent a political power responsive to external forces and not entirely un-
16. Id. at 108.
17. M. Hodges, Multinational Corporations and National Government (1974).
18. Kobrin, supra note 12, at 107.
19. Hodges, supra note 17, at 7.
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der control of the host. ' Therefore, the use of bribery and other misconduct
by MNCs results in an imbalance of political, economic, and social forces
operative within a host country, thereby disrupting self-determined national
and social development.
The following hypothetical situation demonstrates the interplay of the
factors resulting in a questionable payment. The setting is that of a MNC
managing American oil in a small Central American country where a few
large American firms have dominated the economy for forty years in the
critical fields of oil production and refining and in banana production and
exportation.
The corporations employ thousands of local people, pay high taxes,
and by implication, have much to say about what kind of government exists
there.
Amidst a setting of political instability are frequent rumors of CIA ac-
tivities. It is also believed that the company's harbor agents make efforts to
maintain the status quo, while the local people are discriminated against in
having and remaining in jobs of lesser capacities in the corporation.
A political activist seeking a foothold in national politics speaks out
against the companies. After his speech, a riot causes $100,000 damage to
the oil company.
Subsequently, the local president of the American company receives a
visit by a representative of the political activist. He points out the trends
towards possible expropriation and the activist's capability to incite the
country against the American company. The representative also states that
the activist is not wealthy and needs funds to continue his career in politics.
He suggests that if the American company will hire the activist as a consul-
tant at a salary of S100,000 a year, it is quite likely that attacks against the
company will taper off.2'
It is in situations of this type that questionable government payments
occur. However, due to the tremendously important social function of
MNCs as conduits for information and technology transfer, and as a means
for capital investment in developing areas, solutions lie in the development
of mechanisms for control, rather than in elimination of the MNCs.
IV. SOME EFFECTS OF MNC's ON
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Since regulation of the conduct of MNCs is the key issue in the problem
of questionable payments, it is necessary to determine how the Latin
American countries are affected by the MNCs. Following that analysis, con-
clusions may then be drawn as to viable and meaningful remedial regula-
tion. From the perspective of a progressive, industrialized nation, the Latin
American countries are deemed to be lesser developed countries (LDCs).
20. Kobrin, supra note 12, at 108.
21. S. Robock & K. Simmonds, International Business and Multinational Enterprises at
618, 619 (1973).
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Underdevelopment in an institutional setting means a lack of adequately
trained government civil servants who can investigate and determine
whether commercial and business laws are being enforced.2 Further, ex-
isting laws are antiquated, and are unable to meet such major changes in the
origins of economic power as the development of MNCs. In addition, the
institutions of the LDCs are either not present, or are malfunctioning
relative to similar institutions in developed countries.
In many cases Latin American LDCs face political, social, and
economic instability. Competing movements playing upon their new
nationalism cause a continuous undercurrent of political instability. Anx-
ious to develop industry and to stabilize their monetary systems, the LDCs
chafe from their dependence on imported technology and goods, and are
unsatisfied with the MNC market criteria for decision-making and use of
their resources. LDCs' social concerns with development and equitablepar-
ticipation in economic growth severely conflict with the limits and social
costs of MNC market efficiency strategies. An LDC's drive for development
coupled with the sheer presence of an MNC, will necessarily have an impact
on changing consumer oriertations, uproot traditional forms of family and
village life by contributing to urbanization, and create new systems of values
and aspirations within the culture,23 which lend to instability in the LDC.
This setting of instability coupled with inadequate institutions and
regulatory structures, leaves the Latin American LDCs vulnerable to certain
MNC abuses in a trade-off for the technology and industrial development
contributed by the presence of the MNCs. Therefore, in the absence of suf-
ficient restraints, the MNCs exacerbate the problems of Latin American
LDCs, particularly in the critical areas of technology and finance.2 4 While
industrialization and goals of economic growth require that technology be
available from the developed countries, the problem is that concentrated
control of technology remains in foreign hands. As to finance, rather than
bringing in finance capital from abroad, MNCs seek funds from local host
sources. Due to the established credit of MNCs, the lending pattern of local
institutions is to prefer MNCs over local entrepreneurs, following the
business logic of risk minimization. There are even greater problems for the
host country when local lenders are branch MNC lenders like Bank of
America and First National City Bank of New York. 5 Opportunities for
market entry by local businessmen are thus severely curtailed. While these
effects on technology and finance are attributable to the presence of the
MNCs, they are also a result of a lack of, or inadequate governmental con-
trols over capital flow, local borrowing limitations, utilization of foreign
supplies, as well as capital, and realistic regulation of imports and exports.
22. Muller, The Multinational Corporation and the Exercise of Power: Latin America,
The New Sovereigns Multinational Corporations as World Powers (Said & Simmons, Eds.
1975).
23. 1. Gunneman ed., The Nation-State and Transnational Corporations in Conflict -
With Special Reference to Latin America (1975).
24. Muller, supra note 22, at 56.5
25. Id. at 58.
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The structural impact of MNCs' concentration and power on LDCs
has been empirically reflected in a pre-1970 study of Chile.26 The study
showed that for the period from 1967 to 1969, participation by MNCs in the
industrial sector increased from 16.6 percent to 20.3 percent, while domestic
participation diminished from 76.1 percent to 63.0 percent. The difference
represents state owned firms. Of the once hundred largest industrial firms,
forty were MNC controlled. When the sample was increased to the one hun-
dred and sixty largest industrial firms, over fifty-one percent were MNC
controlled. Among seven firms involved in the most important industries in
Chile, at least fifty-one percent of total production was controlled by one to
three foreign firms in each industrial sector. A behavioral analysis of the
twenty-two largest MNCs in Chile revealed that five were monopolists, six
were duopolists and eight were oligopolists, with each of the eight being the
largest supplier in its market. According to this study, these figures reflect
not only the reality in Chile prior to 1970, but are representative of most
LDCs in Latin America where MNCs are currently operating. Further, the
study indicates the ability of the MNCs operating in LDCs in Latin America
to increase their power over time.
Some general conclusions can be drawn about the impact of MNCs on
the political, economic and social sectors of Latin American host countries.
The technology contributed to the countries by the MNCs is a basic cause of
further unemployment because as total output increases, less and less labor
is required to produce that output. In addition, further concentration of
already extreme disparities in income distribution is due to the MNCs.
27
In the absence of effective regulation by the LDCs, the financial con-
tribution of the MNCs to the Latin American host countries is, in reality, a
drain on local savings and ultimately on consumption by the people. The
MNCs' transfer of consumptive ideology goals may be relaized by only
twenty percent of the LDCs' population, thereby contributing to social and
political frustrations. 28 Potential inflows are minimized while the balance of
payments outflows are accentuated through import overpricing and inflated
royalty payments. Interestingly, studies revealed that MNCs did not have
superior export performance relative to local producers and exporters,
unless MNC exports were accompanied by export underpricing.2" Finally,
the MNCs' structuring process permits an ever tightening control over the
technology and the finances of the Latin American host countries, thereby
perpetuating the ever increasing external dependence of these poorer na-
tions on the richer, more industrialized nations of the world. 30
V. CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEMES
Since regulation of MNCs is the key not only to the problem of
questionable payments, but to the conduct of MNCs in the LDCs of Latin
26. id at 59.
27. Id. at 66.
28. Id. at 67.
29. Id. at 66.
30. Id.
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America generally, it is necessary to consider the operative regulatory struc-
ture of the United States and the Latin American countries. Often, United
States policies and regulatory schemes conflict with those of the Latin
American countries. This is true even when both the United States and
Latin American policies are directed toward international cooperation,
since different means of achieving those policies creates conflict.3" A further
complicating factor is that the framework of the regulatory scheme involves
four levels: local or state, national, regional, and international. The con-
flicting interests and interplay among the levels may be observed in the ex-
propriation problems ITT had with Brazil.
During the 1960's, two states of Brazil sought to expropriate ITT
facilities there. In one state, a town sought to expropriate local facilities
while in the other state, the state government sought expropriation. The Un-
ited States government was brought in because of the potential use of the
Hickenlooper Amendment by ITT to deal with the expropriations. Brazil
was brought in to protect its interests against the possibility of being cut off
from United States aid. Regional considerations were involved since there
was a threat of setting a precedent throughout the Latin American coun-
tries. Finally at the international level, international law and agreements
were urged as a means of mediation.32 The result was that the federal
government of Brazil was forced to act to carry out expropriations inap-
propriately initiated at the lower local levels, and against the prevailing
foreign policies of the federal government.
VI. ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PAYMENTS PROBLEM
For effective resolution of the problems and misconduct caused by the
MNCs, joint action by the United States and Latin America, as well as all
other involved and interested countries, is necessary in formulating
regulatory schemes for the MNCs. However, several factors complicating
joint action are readily apparent. Latin American interests at an inter-
national level have not been articulated,33 nor is it likely that a uniform in-
terest could be articulated in view of existing differences in the needs and
policies of the various Latin American countries. In addition, inconsisten-
cies due to different policies of implementation abound even among Andean
Code members, who have agreed upon governing regulations and regional
code provisions.34 Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Organization of
American States adopted a resolution in 1975 regarding the "Behavior of
Transnational Enterprises Operating in the Region and [the] Need For a
Code of Conduct to be Observed by Such Enterprises." Special provision
was made for prohibiting bribery and other illegal payments and political
contributions by the MNCs in the member countries.






The United States has taken steps in several directions in order to stop
questionable payments by the MNCs and by American firms. Predominan-
tly, the tax and securities laws have been used to prosecute those corpora-
tions which have made illegal payments and to deter other corporations
from such behavior.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Internal Revenue Code provision
162 (c) disallowed as deductions, as a trade or business expense, improper
payments to officials or employees of foreign countries.35 The Tax Reform
Act of 1976 (TRA) broadened the provisions of 162 (c),16 and added to the
Code a new area of law dealing with foreign bribe produced income.37 Sec-
tion 1065 of the TRA provides that foreign bribes shall include in the
"deemed distributed" income of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs)
and domestic international sales corporations (DISCs), the amount of any
illicit payments to foreign officials, employees or agents in fact of foreign
governments. Such payments are also disallowed as deductions from cor-
porate earnings under that provision. By amending the definition of subpart
F income to include illegal bribes and payments, United States shareholders
of CFCs will be taxed on the payments as a distribution of the CFC's earned
income or profits, since the distribution is treated as dividend income.38 In
addition to these new developments in the tax laws, the securities laws and
their enforcement are a second important force in policing questionable
payments.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has implemented four
methods of dealing with the problem of questionable payments: The en-
forcement program, the voluntary disclosure program, proposed legisla-
tion, and the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure.39 The SEC's enforcement program has been a most effective un-
ilateral method of policing the illegal payments problem. To date, nine ac-
tions have been brought against corporations for violations of§§ 13, 14, 10b
and Rule lob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.40 These provi-
sions govern reporting, proxy, and antifraud, respectively.The SEC charged
the corporations with violations of the 1934 Act - their filing of false and
misleading reports with the SEC without disclosing improper payments to
foreign agents or government officials.
4
1
SEC v. United Brands Company, an action filed in April 1975 and subse-
quently settled in January 1976 with the entry of an injunction and consent
35. 26 U.S.C. § 162(c).
36. 26 U.S.C. § 162(c), as amended 1976.
37. Note, International Boycott Income and Foreign Bribe Produced Income, 9 Law & Pol'y
Int'l Bus 319 (1977).
38. Id.
39. Investment Regulation, Illegal Payments Abroad, 9 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 234 (1977).
40. Testimony of Comm. Philip A. Loomis, Jr., SEC, Before the Subcommittee on Inter-
national Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations, 9-30-75, The
SEC Speaks in 1976 at 634 (Sommer and Levenson Co-Chr. 1976).
41. Id.
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decree,42 was the first time that § l0b and Rule lOb-5 were invoked in con-
nection with disclosure and questionable payments. United Brands, a New
Jersey corporation and one of the world's largest producers and marketers
of bananas, was charged with violations of §§ 13(a), 10(b) and Rule l0b-5.
United Brands had agreed to pay $2.5 million to high government officials
in Honduras in exchange for favorable government action regarding a
recently enacted export tax which would have had a materially adverse ef-
fect upon the corporation. United Brands' failure to disclose these and other
payments was deemed fraudulent behavior for filing false and misleading
reports.
43
As distinguished from the enforcement program, the voluntary dis-
closure program encourages the corporations themselves to conduct in-
vestigations to determine what payments are being made to whom, and
whether or not such information has been properly reported to the SEC and
to shareholders. 44 Of course, the liability for failure to disclose material in-
formation under the 1934 Act is an incentive for corporate cooperation. The
issue of stricter disclosure arises in the context of the voluntary disclosure
program as well as in recently enacted legislative remedies. In as much as the
basic integrity of American capital markets is at issue, the policy of the
securities laws - to promote full and fiar disclosure as necessary and ap-
propriate for the protection of investors - has been employed to support
the argument that questionable foreign payments are material informa-
tion.4" Materiality is the measure of the need for disclosure. A study of the
corporate disclosure system and the objectives of the SEC in seeking dis-
closure was made by the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis-
closure. The summary findings together with the SEC's recommendations
were submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs on May 12, 1976.1
6
On December 17, 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 was
enacted to impose criminal liability upon United States companies bribing
foreign government officials for specified corrupt purposes, and to amend
certain of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 reporting and disclosure
provisions.47 A payment made for a specified corrupt purpose is "a payment
made to a foreign official for the purpose of inducing him to obtain or retain
business for the corporation or to influence legislation or regulations of the
government." 4 A corrupt purpose, as used in the Act, signifies misuse of an
official position to obtain favorable treatment. Payment includes offer,
promise, or gift; however, "grease payments" are not included (payments
for expediting shipments through customs, securing required permits or ob-
taining adequate police protection), nor is true extortion included (payment
42. Lit. Re[. No. 7251, SEC v. United Brands Company, The SEC Speaks in 1976 at 695
(Sommer and Levenson Co-Chr. 1976).
43. Id. at 696.
44. Investment Regulation, supra note 39, at 235.
45. The SEC Speaks in 1976, supra note 40, at 661.
46. S. Rep. No. 114, supra note 6, at 6307.
47. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1978).
48. S. Rep. No. 114, supra note 6, at 6316.
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to an official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited). 9 Further, in order
for the Act to cover the payment, there must be a nexus with the United
States-use of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the U.S. mails
as well as knowledge of the payment on the part of the domestic concern. 0
Sanctions for violation of the criminal provisions of the Act include max-
imum fines of $500,000 for companies, and a maximum fine of $10,000 and
up to five years imprisonment for individuals acting on behalf of the com-
panies." As a practical matter, direct criminalization relieves the govern-
ment's enforcement burden and entails no reporting responsibilities for the
corporations.
The Act is divided into two titles: Title I deals with corporate bribery of
foreign officials and Title II focuses on improvement of discrosure of true
corporate ownership. In order to minimize falsification of corporate
records, Title I is designed to establish a system of internal controls on the
proper use of corporate assets through the imposition of stringent ac-
counting standards. In addition Title I prescribes the prohibitions against
corporate bribery.5 2 Title II seeks to provide more accurate information
about corporate ownership by requiring the disclosure of residence,
citizenship, and nature of beneficial ownership of a purchaser of more than
five percent of any class of registered equity securities." Moreover, the
background and nationality of associates of the purchaser entitled to ac-
quire additional shares of the issuer must be disclosed. A significant purpose
of Title II of the Act is to limit the abuse of nominee and street name
registration by obscuring the true chain of ownership, thereby adversely af-
fecting the intended jurisdictional reach of both the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.54 However, the United
States' unilateral actions in dealing with the problem. International
cooperation is imperative.
The regulation of transnational corporations is not a new idea inter-
nationally. An historical review 11 reveals that after World War I, the
League of Nations studied the possibility of international controls for car-
tels and industrial agreements. No action was taken, however, due to diverse
national policies, objections as to loss of sovereignty, and the fact that car-
tels were deemed efficient and beneficial. Before the end of World War II,
the United States planned for an International Trade Organization to
regulate many areas of international trade. The Havana Charter of 1948
prohibited business practices affecting international trade which restrained
competition, limited access to markets, or fostered monopolistic control.
The Charter failed when United States support was withdrawn. Since then,
a similar United Nations draft code was drawn in 1953, the European
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6317.
51. Id. at 6308.
52, Id. at 6313.
53. Id. at 6318.
54. Id. at 6320.
55. Joelson & Griffin, supra note 1, at 10.
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Economic Community was formed, the Andean Code was formulated, and
various other economic and regulatory movements involving cooperation
among nations have occurred.
At the present time the United Nations Committee on Transnational
Corporations is working to formulate a code of conduct for the MNCs. To
date, the code envisioned deals with the activities of the MNCs in three
areas: General and political conduct, economic, financial and social regula-
tion, and disclosure of information to be used to better regulate MNC ac-
tivities. The other portion of the code is to be directed toward the treatment
of the MNCs by the home and host countries, with primary focus on
jurisdiction for settlement of disputes,and the problems of nationalization
and compensation.56
In 1976 the Council of Ministers of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted voluntary guidelines
regarding the conduct of MNCs.17 The United States adopted the guidelines
together with twenty-two other members. The purpose of the OECD
guidelines is threefold: To encourage MNCs to contribute to economic and
social development; to encourage "national treatment" of MNCs by host
countries; and, to promulgate standards of business conduct to be observed
by the MNCs. The guidelines expressly prohibit the making of bribes and il-
legal political contributions, as well as improper participation in local
political activities. Information disclosure is encouraged and anti-
competitive practices are prohibited."
At a special seminar of the United States Council of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), United States businessmen and government
officials approved the OECD action.5 9 Seminar members felt that the
guidelines would lead to greater and more uniform enforcement of ICC
member nations' bribery and enforcement laws. Furthermore, it was felt
MNCs adhering to the new standards for business conduct would upgrade
their overseas financial disclosure practices to bring them in line with
United States standards.
The OECD guidelines are a promising remedial measure due par-
ticularly to the scope of the parties involved.
60
The multilateral nature of the guidelines should assuage concerns that
United States' MNCs would be at any competitive disadvantage commer-
cially inasmuch as all member nations adopting the guidelines are equally
bound. Since joint action is necessary to promote disclosure and to stop
bribery by the MNCs, all industrialized democracies, the United States,
56. U.N. Comm. on Transnational Corporations: Intergovernmental Working Group
Report on the Formulation of a Code of Conduct (3rd Sess.) E/C 10/31 as published in 16
I.L.M. 709 (1977).
57. OECD: Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Tax Mgm't. Int'l J. (Aug. 1976).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Cutler, supra note 2, at 167.
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Latin America, and the MNCs must become involved. Concerted action will
be required to formulate threshold requirements (setting a dollar amount
yearly on contract or government actions), to negotiate agreements on stan-
dards, and to enforce common interests.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The complexities of dealing with the problem of bribery and other
questionable conduct by the MNCs extend beyond the conflicting needs of
development of the Latin American nations and the established difficulties
of true cooperation among those and other nations. Despite the fact that
MNCs are acknowledged as new and significant nonpolitical actors in the
traditional international scenario of nation-states, not a single solution to
the problem actually grapples with this factor. Moreover, we cannot escape,
deny or ignore the fact that global economics and power sources have and
will continue to change. Until our institutions and our approach to problem
solving adjust to and incorporate these changes, our remedies will remain
inadequate.
61. Id. at 169, 171.
